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COMMENT/Tenants' Remedies in the District of
Columbia: New Hope for Reform

Introduction
Today, after more than three decades of fragmented and grossly
under-funded Federal housing programs, decent housing remains a
chronic problem for the disadvantaged urban household. Fifty-six
percent of the country's nonwhite families live in central cities today,
and of these, nearly two-thirds live in neighborhoods marked by
substandard housing and general urban blight. For these citizens,
condemned by segregation and poverty to live in the decaying slums
of our central cities, the goal of a decent home and suitable environment is as far distant as ever.1
Today, less than three years after sections of the legal profession began a
concentrated assault on ancient precedents in the area of landlord and tenant
law, much of what lawyers think of as progress has occurred. In 1966, when
Robert S. Schoshinski published Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal
for Change,2 the District of Columbia faced crisis in two areas: total frustration of the slum dweller on the social front 3 and total absence of suitable
civil remedies on the legal front. 4 As a result of the efforts of the Neighborhood Legal Services Program, enough of a change has taken place in the District of Columbia to make possible the beginnings of a critical evaluation of
Professor Schoshinski's proposals as they have affected the lawyer and his
slum-dwelling client.
The approach of Professor Schoshinski's article was that of a scatter-gun,
characterized by a wide-ranging search of all conceivable legal arguments,
a cataloging and conglomerating of theories without specific emphasis on the
usefulness of the resulting remedies to the low-income tenant or the suitability
of the theories to this jurisdiction's legal precedents. At the time of the article,
a catalogue was what the legal profession needed; now, when certain theories
have been tested in the courts, a study is needed that can be evaluative as
well as additive.
1. REPORT OF
1, 1968).

THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS

257 (March

2. 54 GEO. L.J. 519 (1966).
3. See Lowe, Some Sociological Implications of Poor Housing in the Second Precinct,
Washington, D.C. in SUBSTANDARD HOUSINO IN THE NATION'S CAPITAL-THE DISTRICT

OF COLUMBIA 137-70 (Howard University School of Law June 1, 1966).
4. See Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54 GEO.

L.J. 519, 519-21 (1966).
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Comments

Clearly, the changes that must take place in the decisions of the District of
Columbia courts are revolutionary ones. For the slum-dweller in need of immediate relief, these changes must occur at the trial level. Unfortunately,
many of the lower court judges who must implement this revolution aimed at
public values of courts are reluctant to give effect to even creeping reform.
Time after time, the arguments based on Professor Schoshinski's theories
have been summarily rejected without even an appellate brief to commemorate their passing.5 Only one argument advanced by Professor Schoshinski has
met with approval by any trial judge; i.e., the illegal bargain argument based
on violations of the Housing Regulations. 6 The reasons for its singular acceptance will be discussed below.
For any change to occur at the trial level before the long process of appeal
and re-appeal, it must appear as unrevolutionary and consistent as possible
with prior case law in the given jurisdiction. At the same time, arguments
must not be made which would lead to remedies so ineffectual and useless to
low-income tenants that no real change will be made at all. These two state-

5. Within a week of Mr. Paul F. Cohen's successful presentation of the illegal bargain
argument to Judge Edgerton in Adams v. Lancaster, Small Claims No. C 12912-67
(D.C. Gen. Sess. Oct. 25, 1967), reported in 17 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 537 (1968), he
presented it unsuccessfully to two other judges in General Sessions.
The striking resistance to change of certain judges of the District of Columbia Court
of General Sessions can be seen in the comments of a trial court judge on unconscionability. In Jones v. Sheetz, 242 A.2d 208 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1968), the landlord
brought an action to regain possession of leased premises. The tenant had completed
three years of law school, worked as a tax consultant, and occupied the premises for
more than four years before claiming the rental agreement was oppressive. Although these
circumstances were such that a trial judge's ruling that the lease agreement was
conscionable probably would not be reversed on appeal, the trial judge retorted the
following comments on unconscionability, a defense to contract that has been statutorily
as well as judicially effective in the District since 1965. See D.C. CoDE ANN. § 28-2-302
(1967); Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
After first calling questions concerning commercial setting "tommyrot," the trial judge
continued:
Don't give me all that liberal garbage about how somebody is in an unfair
bargaining position just because they happen to do business with a businessman.
If you start into that sort of thing, then you are going to have some government
watchdog sitting here and arbitrating every possible agreement. . . . [Ilf ...

[a

contract] is unconscionable because one person happens to have a little mote
commercial experience than another or because somebody has a little more
education than somebody else . . . [then] we have . . . government arbitrators

sitting in and deciding on every possible sort of transaction that people get
into. . . . The minute you do that, you have absolutely destroyed the free
society and you have brought about what is nothing more than "big brother
government ..
Id., Brief for Appellant at 39, citing Trial Transcript at 249-51.
The trial judge gave as an example of minimum requirements of unconscionability a
lease in which "a tenant is paying three times as much rent as he ought to be paying,
he is also supposed to build a whole new house in back as part of the rent." Ibid.
6. Adams v. Lancaster, supra note 5.
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ments contain the kernel of the criteria by which available or proposed
remedies will be judged.
JudicialRemedies for Housing Regulations Violations
Underlying any discussion of the adequacy of remedies available to the lowincome tenant for the landlord's failure to maintain habitability is the assumption that the tenant has a recognizable right of action. At common law,
7
the lessor did not impliedly warrant premises to be tenantable or suitable.
Absent a covenant in the lease, no duty was imposed on the landlord to make
ordinary repairs or to maintain habitability. 8 A lessor's promise to make repairs was viewed merely as an independent covenant, the breach of which
would not excuse a tenant from his obligation to pay rent.9 To alleviate these
harsh common law principles, it has been proposed that housing and building
codes provide a statutory basis to impose an implied contractual obligation on
landlords.10 More specifically, Professor Schoshinski has suggested that the
District of Columbia Housing Regulations11 should suffice to imply a warranty of habitability in modern leases and impose a duty on lessors to maintain
and repair the premises. 12 Constructive eviction or an action for damages
7. Fisher v. Ligthall, 15 D.C. (4 Mackey) 82, 89 (Sup. Ct. 1885). Accord, Hughes
v. Westchester Dev. Corp., 77 F.2d 550, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1935); Slabe v. Beyer, 149 A.2d
788, 789 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1959).
8. Paratino v. Gildenhorn, 4 F.2d 938, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1925).
9. Pinching v. Wurdeman, 12 F.2d 164, 166 (D.C. Cir. 1926); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 3.38 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 3 H. TIFFANY, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 909

(3d ed. B. Jones 1939).
10. See, e.g., Haskell, The Case for an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real
Property, 53 GEo. L.J. 633, 648 (1965).
11. HOUSING REGULATIONS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (1967)

[hereinafter cited

as HOUSING REG.]. These regulations, established and authorized by District of Columbia Commissioners' Order No. 55-1503, August 11, 1955, provide in part:
Section 1201-The owner of a building used for residential purposes shall provide such building with adequate facilities for heating, ventilating and lighting the same ....
Section 2401-The owner or licensee of each residential building shall provide and maintain the facilities, utilities and services required by this part ....
Section 2501-Every premises accommodating one or more habitations shall
be maintained and kept in repair so as to provide decent living accommodations for the occupants ....
12. Schoshinski, supra note 4, at 523-27, 529, 537. The District of Columbia Court of
Appeals recently negated such a suggestion in Saunders v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., Nos.
4119-22 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 1968). Chief Judge Hood stated: "We find
nothing in the Housing Regulations expressly or necessarily implying that a contractual
duty is imposed on the landlords to comply with the Regulations." Id. at 4. In support
of its conclusion, the court noted that the Housing Regulations provide penal sanctions
as well as authorizing the suspension or revocation of a landlord's housing license for
violation of the Regulations. In addition, the court observed that the general language
found throughout the Regulations, such as "good repair," "normal demands, .... adequate,"
etc., indicates that enforcement of the Regulations is better left to the judgment and
discretion of trained personnel authorized to administer them. Finally, the court declared
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would be available to tenants upon a landlord's failure to meet the statutory
standards of habitability.
Constructive Eviction and Action for Damages
These remedies have existed since 1926 in the District of Columbia. In Pinching v. Wurdeman, 13 the landlord failed to make repairs as covenanted in the
lease. The tenant abandoned the premises while part of the lease term still
remained. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, in granting the landlord's suit for rent due for the remainder of the
term, listed the remedies available to the tenant; he could either abandon
the premises within a reasonable time of their becoming uninhabitable or file
an action for damages for breach of covenant. Forty-two years later, these
remedies have become antiquated and inadequate.
Constructive eviction requires abandonment of the uninhabitable dwelling
and a move to new premises. Where a substantial minority-as much as fortyone percent 4-of the residences available to low-income tenants in the District of Columbia are dilapidated, moving from one hovel to what will probably be another hovel is no remedy. Moreover, in the seller's market of the
District of Columbia hovels of the requisite price and size are difficult to
find. 15
The action for damages can be raised either as a recoupment or counterclaim to a suit for rent by the landlord, 16 or in a separate suit by a rent-paying tenant. 17 Under the former, the tenant will be evicted for non-payment
of rent and will be in much the same position as if he had been constructively
evicted, except that he can collect damages which are off-set against the rent
due. Under the latter, the tenant will likely be designated either a tenant at
sufferance or a periodic tenant, either of which is subject to eviction by a vexa-

that a statute in derogation of the common law is not to be construed as meaning something other than that which is fairly expressed.
13. Supra note 9.
14. PROBLEMS OF HOUSING PEOPLE IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 41 (National Capital
Planning Commission, July 1966).
15. Lowe, supra note 3, at 152-53. A release by the Washington Planning and Housing Association in January, 1968, indicates that Washington is between 40,000 and
50,000 housing units short of the amount it needs to provide decent quarters for its
.252,000 households.
16. Seidenberg v. Burka, 106 A.2d 499 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1954); Mitchell v.
David, 51 A.2d 375 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1947). DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS

(LANDLORD

&

TENANT BRANCH)

R. 4(c) provides: "In suits in this

branch for recovery of possession of property in which the basis of recovery of possession is nonpayment of rent, tenants may set up an equitable defense or claim by way of
recoupment or set-off in an amount equal to the rent claim. No counterclaim may be
filed unless plaintiff asks for money judgment for rent."

17. Cf. Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Griffith, 43 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1930).

84
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tious landlord within thirty days,' 8 thus confronting him with the difficulty
of finding a new residence. Even if the tenant is one of the minority of lowincome tenants who have leases for a term, he still must determine whether
such a suit will produce damages great enough to justify itself.
The tenant's damages can be measured as the difference between the total
of all rents paid to the landlord for the particular apartment during the time
it has been in violation of the District of Columbia Housing Regulations, and
the worth of the unsuitable premises on the rental market during this period. 19
One method of determining the latter is by a quality comparison with similar
apartments in the market area. Even if the tenant has the resources to establish, presumably by expert testimony, the rental-market worth of any given
apartment in the District of Columbia, the rental-market worth of an apartment with Housing Regulations violations on the high-demand low-supply
market may be such that the damages are less than the sizable expense of
hiring an expert appraiser. That the rental-market worth of inadequate housing is often only slightly less than the rent charged, even though the rent for
inadequate housing is as high as that charged for adequate housing, is not
surprising in view of the landlord's oft-bemoaned and sometimes documented
bare minimum of profit. 20 Such an action for damages, even if it reduces the
amount of rent by as much as twenty-five percent, would be fruitful only if
enough similarly situated tenants are involved to make the cost of hiring the
expert appraiser reasonably consonant with the returns.
Constructive Eviction without Abandonment
Professor Schoshinski has also recommended that the common law constructive eviction requirement of abandonment within a reasonable time be discarded in light of the contemporary housing situation. 21 The resultant
remedy would be genuinely useful. It would enable the tenant to avoid the
hardships of constructive eviction while taking advantage of its benefittermination of the rental obligation. The difficulty with this legal theory is
that the District of Columbia courts have not accepted it. The theory is based
upon two New York cases which in turn are based upon a public policy declaration of a kind and vigor unique to New York City. The two cases, John18. D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-902 (1968): "A tenancy from month to month, or from
quarter to quarter, may be terminated by a thirty days' notice in writing from the landlord to the tenant to quit .... " D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-903 (1968): "A tenancy at will
may be terminted by thirty days' notice in writing by either landlord or tenant." But
see Edwards v. Habib, No. 20883 (D.C. Cir. May 17, 1968).
19. Cf. Lalekos v. Manset, 47 A.2d 617 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1946).
20. Two plausible reasons for the near approximation between actual rents charged
and market value of slum apartments are: 1) the scarcity of land in the District driving up the worth of the land itself; and 2) the scarcity of low-cost apartments driving
up the market worth of the available apartments.
21. Schoshinski, supra note 4, at 529-31.
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son v. Pemberton22 and Majen Realty Corp. v. Glotzer,23 have been bypassed by New York appellate courts. 24 The rationale of the cases is based upon
judicial notice of a housing shortage; the judicial notice arises not from sociological evidence of the shortage, such as is available in the District of Columbia, but from executive-legislative notice of the shortage in New York's rent
25
control legislation.
The abandonment requirement is premised on the assumption that if the
dwelling was in fact uninhabitable, the tenant would not have remained in
possession but would have moved elsewhere. The New York cases recognized
that once this assumption is undermined by evidence, such as remedial legis26
lation, of a housing shortage, the reason for the requirement disappears.
Majen permits only two grounds for the invocation of the constructive eviction without abandonment theory: "no living accommodations available elsewhere or .. .such a scarcity of them that impels the legislature to declare a
public emergency ....
-"27 (Emphasis added.)

The housing shortage in the District of Columbia has not reached such
a severe state that there is no other habitation available to a tenant; housing
is merely scarce and dilapidated. The legislation and regulations for the District of Columbia, moreover, do not even bear upon the scarcity but only upon
the quality of housing. The Commissioners' preamble to the Housing Regulations lists an entire paragraph of conditions which are "deleterious to the
[public] health, safety, welfare, and morals" ;2s scarcity of housing is not one
of these. The policy declaration of Congress in the D.C. Code is similarly
concerned with "blighted" and "substandard" housing, 29 not with scarce housing; on the contrary, it is the abundance of slums that appears to cause congressional and administrative worries.
Injunctive Relief Based on Nuisance
The injunctive remedy for nuisances can be invoked only in the absence of
an adequate remedy at law. Professor Schoshinski indicates that both owners
and tenants have been permitted injunctive relief against nuisances outside
22. 197 Misc. 739, 97 N.Y.S.2d 153 (Mun. Ct. 1950).
23. 61 N.Y.S.2d 195 (Mun. Ct. 1946).
24. See Gombo v. Martise, 44 Misc. 2d 239, 253 N.Y.S.2d 459 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Two
Park Ave. Co. v. Intermediate Factors Corp., 17 Misc. 2d 442, 187 N.Y.S.2d 149 (Sup.
Ct. 1958).
25. See RENT REGULATION FOR HOUSING IN NEW YORK CITY DEFENSE RENTAL
AREA (1944); 1949 FEDERAL HOUSING REGULATION (N.Y.C.) § 825.23. Rent control
legislation was adopted in the District of Columbia during World War II, but was
abandoned in 1953 when Congress believed the shortage had abated below emergency

levels. See D.C.

CODE ANN.

§ 45-1601 (1968).

26. Johnson v. Pemberton, supra note 22, at 743, 97 N.Y.S.2d at 157.
27. Majen Realty Corp. v. Glotzer, supra note 23, at 197.

28. HOUSING REG. § 2101 (1967).
29. D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-701 (1966).
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the premises, while only owners have been granted injunctive relief against
nuisances such as howling dogs or wandering cattle coming onto the premises. 30 The problems of tenants for which Schoshinski seeks equitable relief
are different from these; generally, they come under the heading of housing
code violations.
District of Columbia courts have defined nuisance as " 'anything that works
or causes injury, damage, hurt, inconvenience, annoyance, or discomfort to
one in the legitimate enjoyment of his reasonable rights of person or property .... , "31 Professor Schoshinski argues that a landlord who allows housing
conditions to fall below statutory standards causes "an unreasonable interference with the tenant's interest in the use and enjoyment of the property...
[and] disturbance to the comfort or convenience of the tenant." 32 Even if
this argument is accepted, tenants do have legal remedies against such problems-constructive eviction or a suit for damages for breach of an implied
covenant. Equitable relief would seem to be precluded.
The adequacy of these legal remedies can be questioned. The grounds on
which they can be questioned, however, do not seem sufficient to justify
equitable relief. Constructive eviction can be labeled inadequate because of
the lack of suitable, habitable premises available to displaced low-income
tenants, but without legislative-executive recognition of this shortage it is unlikely equitable relief will be granted. A damages award is usually inadequate
due to the near accord of actual rent and rental-market worth of substandard
housing in the District of Columbia. If recoverable financial damages are
minimal, it might be concluded that little actual damage was done, so an
equitable remedy may be deemed inappropriate. Although both of these difficulties could be overcome by a judge sympathetic to sociological evidence
of insufficient suitable housing and to evidence of sociological and psychological damage immeasurable in dollars and cents, the fact remains that the same
trial judge who considers such evidence in cases at law would be evaluating
it in equity suits.

33

30. Schoshinski, supra note 4, at 539.
31. District of Columbia v. Totten, 5 F.2d 374, 380 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 269
U.S. 562 (1925). See also Reese v. Wells, 73 A.2d 899 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1950);
Levy v. Bryce, 46 A.2d 765 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1946).
32. Schoshinski, supra note 4, at 540.
33. In Edwards v. Habib, supra note 18, discussed infra, United States Court of Appeals Judge Wright noted that "[i]n trying to effect the will of Congress and as a court
of equity we have the responsibility to consider the social context in which our decisions will have operational effect," and thus held the District of Columbia's eviction
statute, quoted supra note 18, to be ineffectual where the landlord brings an eviction
action in retaliation for the tenant's reporting housing code violations. One of several
factors considered by the court in striking a balance between the housing regulations
and the eviction statute was "the appalling condition and shortage of housing in Washington ....
" Id. at 23. But notice taken of sociological facts in seeking the intent of
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Defense of Illegal Contract
Since the illegal contract defense is the only one of Professor Schoshinski's
suggested grounds which has been accepted by a trial court, 34 a detailed
analysis of the argument and the reasons for its acceptance is in order. The
illegal-bargain argument can be asserted in several distinct types of cases involving a dwelling which is in violation of the Housing Regulations or Certificate of Occupancy requirements. The landlord may be suing for rent due.
The tenant may be suing to recover a deposit or pre-paid rent when no actual use has been made of the premises. The tenant may be suing to recover
all consideration given in payment for actual use. The violation may have
arisen before or after the beginning of the tenancy.
As a condition precedent to making this argument in any of these cases,
it must be found that a contract to rent premises which are in violation of the
Housing Regulations is in fact an illegal bargain. There is every reason to
void such leases. The Housing Regulations embody a vital public policy,
designed to protect a particular class of people in a situation where public
35
enforcement has proved inadequate.
This public policy has been declared by both the D.C. Commissioners and
the Congress. In their preamble to the Housing Regulations, the Commissioners state:

Congress and construing a statute is not the equivalent of taking judicial notice to determine the adequacy of a legal remedy.
Professor Schoshinski also proposes an equitable "constructive eviction" remedy
which is, in essence, constructive eviction without abandonment on the equity side of
the court. This argument would also be conditioned by the trial court's finding an inadequate remedy at law. See Schoshinski, supra note 4, at 532.
34. Adams v. Lancaster, supra note 5.
35. The Housing Regulations provide for a fine up to $300 or ten days imprisonment
for each violation. HousING REG. § 2104 (1967). But penalization of the landlord does
little to relieve the low-income tenant of his plight. Where extensive repairs are needed,
the landlord may be willing to pay a small monetary fine instead of undertaking such a
costly project.
The fact that the present Director of the District of Columbia's Department of Licenses and Inspections, Julian Dugas, has also been a prime mover in searching out
private tenants' remedies indicates some official recognition of the weaknesses of public
enforcement. For a discussion of various administrative and legal difficulties of code
enforcement and compliance, see Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes,
78 HARV. L. RFv. 801 (1965). A brief explanation for the ineffectiveness of public
enforcement has been stated as follows:
One of the few things about which every observer of the slum housing situation agrees is that present enforcement techniques have been a failure. The
combination of bureaucratic overlapping and understaffing, the use of procedural delays to the advantage of recalcitrant landlords, and the lack of militancy by both administrative and judicial officials, have all worked against the
achieving of significant change.
Sax & Hiestand, Slumlordism as a Tort, 65 MIcH. L. REv. 869, 915 (1967).
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The Commissioners of the District of Columbia hereby find and
declare that there exist residential buildings and areas within said
District which are slums or otherwise blighted ....
The Commissioners further find and declare that such unfortunate conditions are due, among other circumstances, to certain conditions affecting such residential buildings and such areas, among
them being the following: dilapidation, inadequate maintenance,
overcrowding, inadequate toilet facilities, inadequate bathing or
washing facilities, inadequate heating, insufficient protection against
fire hazards, inadequate lighting and ventilation, and other unsanitary or unsafe conditions.
The Commissioners further find and declare that the aforesaid
conditions . . . are deleterious to the health, safety, welfare and

morals of the community and its inhabitants.
The Commissioners, accordingly, promulgate these regulations
for the purpose of preserving and promoting the public health,
36
safety, welfare, and morals.
More specifically, the Commissioners state in the Regulations that "[n]o owner,
licensee, or tenant shall occupy or permit the occupancy of any habitation in
violation of these regulations. 37 Congress has made an equally forceful statement declaring it "to be the policy of the United States to protect and promote the welfare of the inhabitants of the seat of the Government by eliminating all such injurious conditions by employing all means necessary and ap1,38
propriate for the purpose ....
Similar policy considerations have been found sufficient to warrant reading
a private remedy into a statute that has none. For example, the Supreme
Court in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak39 noted that a statute's design to protect a
particular class of persons "certainly implies the availability of judicial
relief where necessary to achieve that result." 40 There is precedent in the
District of Columbia for this proposition. The analogy between Housing
Regulations violations and the Loan Shark Law cases 41 of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia is clear. The D.C. Municipal Court of
Appeals has iterated similar relief in Rubin v. Douglas42 concerning unlicensed medical practice.
Recognition of such policy considerations at the trial level can be found in
36.

HousINo

RE(. § 2101 (1967).

37. Id. at § 2301.
§ 5-701 (1966).
39. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
40. Id. at 432.
41. See Indian Lake Estates, Inc. v. Ten Individual Defendants, 350 F.2d 435 (D.C.
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 947 (1966) ; Royall v. Yudelevit, 268 F.2d 577 (D.C.
Cir. 1959) ; Hartman v. Lubar, 133 F.2d 44 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
42. 59 A.2d 690 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1948).
38. D.C. CODE ANN.
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Chief Judge Harold Greene's opinion in Franklin Investment Co. v. Summers,43 which involved a violation of regulations regarding sales of repossessed automobiles-regulations which, like the Housing Regulations, provide
explicitly only for public enforcement. It was held that the violation of these
regulations voided the right to a deficiency judgment. By a parity of reasoning, a violation of the Housing Regulations would void the right to retain or
obtain a rental payment. More significantly, Judge Greene argued from the
Housing Regulations to reach the conclusion that repossession regulations
have civil consequences:
In Whetzel v. less Fisher Management Co. [citation omitted], the
United States Court of Appeals for this Circuit held that a standard
established in a penal statute [Housing Regulations] for the protection of particular individuals will likewise be considered in determining their civil rights and liabilities. Whetzel to be sure, was a
tort case, but its rationale is equally applicable here. As indicated
supra, public policy as established by the legislature plays an imand the enforcement (or non-enportant part in the construction
44
forcement) of contracts.
The reasoning of these cases clearly indicates that a contract to rent premises
in violation of the Housing Regulations should be void as against public
policy, but the consequences of this finding may vary depending upon when
the violation occurred and which party brings suit.
If the landlord is suing for rent due and the premises violate the Housing
Regulations, he cannot claim the rent under the contract since it is illegal.
Instead he must attempt to recover the reasonable value of the premisesmake, in effect, a quantum meruit recovery. Since 1881 a quantum meruit
recovery on an illegal contract has been forbidden by courts in the District of
Columbia. In Strong v. District of Columbia45 the court found illegal a
builder's contract with the D.C. Board of Public Works. Congress had passed
legislation requiring congressional appropriation for money spent by the District government; no such appropriation had been passed for work performed by Strong. In denying Strong's attempt at quantum meruit recovery
of $268,502, the court reasoned:
43. G.S. 5354-66 (D.C. Gen. Sess. Feb. 7, 1967). See also Smith v. Franklin Investment
Co., Civil No. GS 13031-67 (D.C. Gen. Sess., Jan. 12, 1968), reported in 17 CATHOLIC
U.L. REV. 538 (1968).
44. Franklin Investment Co. v. Summers, supra note 43. In Whetzel v. Jess Fisher
Management Co., 282 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960), a ceiling had fallen on a tenant. The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the Housing Regulations
imply a "statutory duty" on the lessor. The landlord's common law tort liability was
thus broadened to include a duty of care imposed by statute.
45. 12 D.C. (1 Mackey) 265 (Sup. Ct. 1881).
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It would be imputing to Congress a lamentable lack of wisdom to
suppose that the plain purpose of the statute . . . could be success-

fully evaded by so shallow a contrivance as that here relied upon.
To allow a recovery upon a quantum meruit for the recovery of
money claimed to be due for work done under a contract which the
law has pronounced void, and payment of which is forbidden by
law, would render the whole inhibition futile, and virtually work a
46
repeal of the statute ....
The parallel between Strong and Housing Regulations cases is clear. Leasehold interests traditionally have been viewed as real chattels, having both the
47
nature of contract and of an estate in property passing with the contract.
Even when the contract was breached by the landlord, a right to recover rent
still arose from the obligation of the estate in land. However, the tenant's use
of an estate uninhabitable by definition of law should not be judically recognized as a benefit requiring consideration any more than the $268,502 of
work Strong performed for the District of Columbia. The clear thrust of cases
in this jurisdiction requires that recovery be denied to a landlord who is party
48
to an illegal contract.
That the landlord cannot recover rent due under the illegal bargain does
not mean the tenant can recover the ill-gotten gains paid to the landlord.
The tenant may be found to be in pari delicto with the landlord. The tenant,
strictly speaking, also violates the Housing Regulations, which state that
"[n]o owner, licensee, or tenant shall occupy or permit the occupancy of any
habitation in violation of these regulations." 49 (Emphasis added.)
However, a series of Loan Shark Law cases has provided the District of
Columbia courts with ample precedents to grant tenants recovery under an
illegal lease. Hartman v. Lubar,5° an action by a borrower to recover chattels
pledged under a void contract, stated that the "general rule is that an illegal
contract . . . is void and confers no right upon the wrongdoer." 5' After restating the Hartman rule, the court in Royall v. Yudelevit5 2 found the theory
of pari delicto no problem in cases of this nature, i.e., "statutory prohibition
46. Id.

at 271. The rationale of Strong was reaffirmed in Gesellschaft Fur Drahtlose

Telegraphie M.B.H. v. Brown, 78 F.2d 410 (D.C. Cir. 1935). Plaintiff Brown had made a
contingent fee lobbying contract with the defendants. The court denied recovery
under

the

contract

since

such

contracts

were

void as

against

public

policy.

The

court further denied Brown's attempt at quantum meruit recovery for his successful
efforts on behalf of defendant's legislation.
47. See C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 69 (1962).
48. See Jess Fisher & Co. v. Hicks, 86 A.2d 177 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1952), where a
lease in violation of the District of Columbia's Rent Control Act was held ineffective.
49. HOUSING REG. § 2301 (1967).
50. Supra note 41.
51. Hartman v. Lubar, supra note 41, at 45.
52. Supra note 41.
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designed for police or regulatory purposes ....

,,53 Royall held that a member

of the class for whose protection the statute was passed was not in pari delictos 4 and thus allowed recovery to plaintiff for wrongful foreclosure on a note
void as against the Loan Shark Law. The final extension of Hartman occurred
in Indian Lake Estates, Inc. v. Ten Individual Defendants55 where the damages recovered by the plaintiff-borrower were the interest collected under the
contract plus all of the principal repaid to the defendants. Under the theory
of these Loan Shark Law cases, a tenant could recover all rent paid the land56
lord during the time the premises contained Housing Regulations violations.
Supported by the precedential weight of these prior appellate decisions,
General Sessions Judge Justin Edgerton applied the illegal bargain theory of
recovery to landlord-tenant case law in Adams v. Lancaster.57 Under an oral
contract to lease certain premises, the plaintiff had advanced $80 to the landlord; she then sought return of the deposit, claiming that the premises were
uninhabitable by Housing Regulations standards and insufficient for a family
the size of hers according to the Certificate of Occupancy. At no time did the
plaintiff occupy the premises. In a brief memorandum decision, citing as authority Hartman v. Lubar,5 8 Judge Edgerton permitted Mrs. Adams to recover her deposit. Even more significantly, the landlord was not permitted to
recover the moving expenses he advanced to Mrs. Adams since the landlord
was the wrongdoer in the illegal transaction.
Within four months of the Adams decision, the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals upheld the illegal bargain defense. In Brown v. Southall Realty
Co.,5 9 the landlord was aware of certain existing Housing Regulations violations when he leased the premises to Mrs. Brown. When Mrs. Brown's rent
fell $230 in arrears, the landlord sued for possession. In denying recovery,
Judge Quinn stated:
The more reasonable view is, therefore, that where such conditions
exist on a leasehold prior to an agreement to lease, the letting of
such premises constitutes a violation of Sections 2304 and 2501 of
the Housing Regulations, and that these Sections do indeed "imply
a prohibition" so as "to render the prohibited act void." Neither
53. Hartman v. Lubar, supra note 41, at 45.
54. Royall v. Yudelevit, supra note 41, at 580.

55. Supra note 41.
56. Similar support for the tenant's recovery is found in Rubin v. Douglas, supra note
42. A patient sued an unlicensed medical practitioner for return of all consideration
paid for treatments. Finding that the contract was illegal and that the patient as a
member of the class to be protected was not in pari delicto, the court permitted the
patient to recover all the consideration.
57. Supra note 5.

58. Supra note 41.
59. 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1968).
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does there exist any reason to treat a lease agreement differently
from any other contract in this regard. 60 (Emphasis added.)
Recently, in Saunders v. First Nat'l Realty Corp.,61 a landlord brought an
action for possession because of nonpayment of rent. The tenants had conceded their inability to prove existence of Housing Regulations violations at
the beginning of the tenancy, and the trial court rejected their offer to show
fifteen-hundred violations in the apartment complex at the time of the suit for
possession. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that violations
occurring after the tenancy commences do not void the lease. In distinguishing
Brown, the court noted that the landlord's knowledge of the violations in Brown
when the premises were rented rendered the resultant lease void and unenforceable.
Under existing case law in the District of Columbia, therefore, the tenant is
permitted to recover all consideration given under an illegal lease when the
tenant has not yet occupied the premises. The landlord cannot recover rent
for the use of premises if they were uninhabitable by Housing Regulations
standards at the beginning of the tenancy. Arguably, the tenant should be
permitted to recover all consideration paid for actual use of the premises
when the lease is initially illegal. 62 It is questionable, however, whether the
courts should permit tenants to recover rent paid or plead the Housing Regulations violations as an equitable defense where they have developed during
the tenancy, since there is a possibility that the tenant, desiring to avoid
rental obligations, may himself cause such defects to develop. But flat
prohibition against such recovery is not a reasonable solution to what is
essentially a burden of proof problem. The courts could assign the tenant
the burden of proving that elements of the Housing Regulations violation
within his knowledge were caused by the landlord's neglect. Certainly, forbidding all such recoveries does not seem sensible when the Housing Regulations

60. Id. at 837.
61. Nos. 4119-22 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 1968).
Earlier, in Jones v. Sheetz, 242 A.2d 208 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1968), a landlord
brought an action to regain possession of leased premises. The trial judge found that no
Housing Regulations violations existed when the tenant acquired possession. The tenant
contended, however, that such violations arising after the tenancy commenced
created a cause of action in him which he should be allowed to use as a set-off to the
landlord's suit. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals was able to avoid discussing
the merits of the argument, since -there was a lack of factual support. Among other
things, the court noted that the tenant made no effort to prove the extent to which the
violations offset his liability for rent. Id. at 211-12. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has recently granted a petition for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis in this case. Jones v. Sheetz, No. Misc. 3290 (D.C. Cir.
Aug. 8, 1968).
62. Cf. Indian Lake Estates, Inc. v. Ten Individual Defendants, supra note 41.
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violation could be a structural defect over which the tenant usually has no
control.
The illegal bargain theory requires relative simplicity of proof. All the tenant need prove is: (1) his tenancy, i.e., that he is a member of the class to be
protected; (2) a report of a Housing Regulations violation resulting from
the landlord's failure to repair, i.e., that the bargain is illegal; and (3) the
amount of the rent paid while the premises violated the Housing Regulations.
The difficulty with this theory, ideal though it may seem to the tenant, is that
the remedy is too drastic; it could easily force slum landlords out of business,
leaving tenants with no available housing to fit their income. This consequence
is not as remote as it may first appear. As one commentator has pointed out:
The essential assumption ...must be that the private owner of lowcost substandard housing can be compelled to rehabilitate and still
serve the same or similarly situated low-income tenants. All the evidence, however, points to the unlikelihood of any such result where
major rehabilitation is required. The failure of the private unsubsidized market to provide new housing for the poor, the marked increase of rents after rehabilitation, the drop in real estate values
in the face of serious code enforcement, all suggest what has by now
become widely recognized: Standard housing for the poor, adequately
maintained, is simply not a sufficiently profitable business to attract
investors.

63

In central cities, where the primary value of land may lie in holding it as an
investment in expectation of a rise in its value resulting from private or public
redevelopment, a landlord is unlikely to continue expending time in operating
a dwelling place if it nets no income, since his return will come ultimately
64
only if the building is razed. As suburban politicians continually point out,
core areas suffer from a chronic lack of parking lots. Conversion of moneylosing apartment house into a break-even parking lot or a tax-loss vacant lot
may appear highly desirable to a landlord who is faced with correcting a
variety of Housing Regulations violations. Drastic reductions of profit from
dwellings may eliminate even dilapidated premises in central city areas.
RetaliatoryEviction and its Prevention
Each of the preceding theories assumes the tenant's dwelling is uninhabitable by Housing Regulations standards. Critical to the proof of such unin63. Sax & Hiestand, supra note 35, at 873-74. (Footnotes omitted.)
64. A bill was introduced in the Senate on May 1, 1968, which would create a
"District of Columbia Parking Board." Title III of this bill, entitled the "District of
Columbia Parking Facility Act," would empower the Parking Board to acquire such
property as needed to maintain adequate parking facilities for the District of Columbia.
The bill was referred to the Committee on Public Works. S. 3418, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1968).
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habitability is a Housing Inspectors' report of the specific violations rendering
the premises inadequate. The ability of the tenant to report these violations is
essential not only to call into operation the public mechanism for Housing
Regulations enforcement but also to evidence the unsuitable condition on
which a civil action against the landlord is based. If a periodic tenant or a tenant at sufferance cannot make a report to the Bureau of Licenses and Inspections without being evicted in retaliation, then all remedies, no matter how
sophisticated, are reduced to the common level of constructive eviction
with its overriding problem of finding a new residence.
In Tarver v. G. & C. Construction Corporation,65 the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that a retaliatory
eviction violates the constitutional right to petition for a redress of grievances. Since this right is a right against government, and not private parties,
government abridgement must first be shown. The Tarver court relied upon
Shelley v. Kraemer66 in finding this requisite "state action." In Shelley the
Supreme Court ruled that judicial enforcement of private agreements containing restrictive covenants against selling houses to Negroes violated the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The judicial intervention supplied the state action. The court in Tarver thus reasoned that not
only are the means and terms of the landlord's right to evict established by
statute, but the eviction itself is also effectuated by use of the state courts.
These facts were held sufficient to constitute state action, and the tenant's
first amendment right to petition the government for a redress of grievances
barred a landlord's retaliatory eviction.
Edwards v. Habib67 presented the District of Columbia courts with the
retaliatory eviction problem. Mrs. Yvonne Edwards, a month-to-month tenant,
complained to the Department of Licenses and Inspections about Housing
Regulations violations. After an inspection disclosing forty such violations, the
Department notified the landlord, Nathan Habib, to repair the premises. Pursuant to the District of Columbia eviction statute, 68 which does not require
a landlord to give any reason at all for eviction, Habib gave Mrs. Edwards a
thirty-day notice to vacate. When Mrs. Edwards refused to surrender the
premises, Habib obtained a default judgment for possession. Mrs. Edwards
moved to reopen the judgment, and Chief Judge Harold Greene of the Court
of General Sessions, in a memorandum opinion on the motion, concluded that
a retaliatory motive, if proved, would constitute a defense to an action for
possession. 69 Judge Greene avoided the "state action" difficulty of Tarver by
65. Civil No. 64-2945 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1964).

66. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
67. Edwards v. Habib, No. 20883 (D.C. Cir. May 17, 1968).

68. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-902, 45-903 (1968).
69. Habib v. Edwards, Civil No. LT 75895-65 (D.C.

Gen. Sess., Oct. 28, 1965).
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ruling that a retaliatory eviction abridged a citizen's constitutional right to
inform his government of a violation of the law-a right which "does not
depend upon any of the Amendments to the Constitution, but arises out of
the creation and establishment by the Constitution itself of a national government, paramount and supreme within its sphere of action . . . -70 In effect,
rights as fundamental as the right to report violations of law are protected
against individuals' action. In setting aside the default judgment, Judge
Greene stated that the burden would be upon the tenant in each instance to
show that the landlord's purpose was unlawful.
Nonetheless, at the subsequent Habib trial the spirit of Judge Greene's
opinion was obliterated by a different judge's demand for an unreachable
level of proof regarding the landlord's intentions. Mrs. Edwards sought to
prove Habib's intention with circumstantial evidence based on his actions and
statements to the Department of Licenses and Inspections. 71 The trial judge
ruled all circumstantial evidence inadmissible as bearing only on "the landlord's reason, for seeking possession," and not on his intentions. 72 Ultimately
the court ruled that only direct evidence of the landlord's purpose in the form
of admissions is admissible. 73 Such admissions were naturally not available
from a careful landlord's pre-trial statements and correspondence; the trial
court's stringent restrictions on the cross-examination of the landlord insured
that there would be no such admissions in court. 74 The eventual result of the
trial rulings was to give the tenant a theoretical remedy with no practical
possibility of proving his case.
After the D.C. Municipal Court of Appeals upheld the trial judge's rulings,75 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia accepted the case for appeal. Judge J. Skelly Wright, after a closely-reasoned
consideration of the constitutional arguments advanced by the New York
court in Tarver and by Judge Greene in his memorandum decision, decided
70. In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 536 (1895) (writ of habeas corpus denied a defendant convicted of conspiring to deny a citizen his right to give information concerning
violations of the law), cited in Habib v. Edwards, supra note 69, at 8.
71. Brief for Appellant at 4-6, Edwards v. Habib, 227 A.2d 388 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App.
1967). The proof offered included a letter from the landlord to the Housing Division
stating:
We got a new tenant Yvonne Edwards, who has been there about 3 months
and she also has not paid rent on time but she too has resorted to complaining to the Housing Division. No landlord can withstand this continuous pressure altho [sic] we understand that you have a job to do.
. . . I
would like to suggest that you hold these writeups in abeyance until
I have a chance to evict Mrs. Yvonne Edwards . . . . (Appellant's emphasis.)

Id. at 4-5, citing Defendant's Exhibit No. 3, Trial Transcript at 61-63.
72. Id. at 9, citing Trial Transcript at 184.

73. Id. at 10, citing Trial Transcript at 103.
74. Id. at 10, citing Trial Transcript at 56-7, 87, 89.
75. Edwards v. Habib, supra note 71.
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for Mrs. Edwards on the basis of a statutory interpretation. 76 He reasoned
that:
It is true that in making his affirmative case for possession the landlord need only show that his tenant has been given the 30-day statutory notice, and he need not assign any reason for evicting a tenant
who does not occupy the premises under a lease. But while the landlord may evict for any legal reason or for no reason at all, he is not,
we hold, free to evict in retaliation for his tenant's report of housing code violations to the authorities. As a matter of statutory construction and for reasons of public policy, such an eviction cannot
be permitted.
The housing and sanitary codes, especially in light of Congress'
explicit direction for their enactment, indicate a strong and pervasive
congressional concern to secure for the city's slum dwellers decent,
or at least safe and sanitary, places to live. Effective implementation and enforcement of the codes obviously depend in part on private initiative in the reporting of violations. .

.

.To permit retalia-

tory evictions, then, would clearly frustrate the effectiveness of the
housing code as a means of upgrading the quality of housing in
7
Washington."
Judge Wright recognized the difficulty of proving a landlord's subjective
motivation when he need give no reason at all for evicting a tenant. Yet he
noted that such a determination "isnot significantly different from problems
with which the courts must deal in a host of other contexts, such as when
they must decide whether the employer who discharges a worker has committed an unfair labor practice because he has done so on account of the em78
ployee's union activities."
76. Edwards v. Habib, supra note 67. The court did not reach the constitutional
issue since "where two interpretations are plausible, [the court will] opt for the one
that avoids the constitutional questions. [Citation omitted.] And second, in discerning
the intent of Congress the court must assume that it too sought to avoid constitutional
doubt and to protect the constitutional interests which are at stake." (Citation omitted.)

Id. at 4 n.6.

77. Id. at 20-22. (Footnotes omitted.)
78. Id. at 26. Cf. Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235 (1967); NLRB v.
Superior Sales, Inc., 366 F.2d 229, 233 (8th Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Melrose Processing
Co., 351 F.2d 693, 698 (8th Cir. 1965); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 191
F.2d 483 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
A Massachusetts statute precludes recovery pursuant to a notice to quit if the
premises violates regulatory standards and "may endanger or materially impair the
health or safety of persons occupying the premises." MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 239,
§ 8(A) (Supp. 1968). Pennsylvania suspends the tenant's obligation to pay rent when
premises fall below statutory standards and, while requiring the tenant to deposit rent in
court, further provides that "[n]o tenant shall be evicted for any reason whatsoever while
rent is deposited in escrow." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Purdon Supp. 1968).
For a discussion of recent legislation proposed for the District of Columbia concerning retaliatory eviction, see Note, Retaliatory Evictions and the Reporting of Housing
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Remedial Legislation for the Low-Income Tenant
The inadequacies of antiquated judicial remedies have prompted several
states to enact remedial legislation. These statutes represent alternative
means of compelling landlords' compliance with housing standards. As with
public enforcement, however, such provisions generally have been ineffective
where substandard and blighted housing is in need of costly and extensive
repairs.
Several states impose a statutory obligation to maintain and repair on lessors and attempt to enforce this duty by "repair and deduct" laws.79 If the
landlord fails to effect necessary changes in housing conditions, the tenant
may contract for the repairs and deduct the cost from the rent due. California
and Montana, however, limit the deduction to one month's rent,80 a considerable shortcoming if extensive repairs are needed. A Pennsylvania statute
suspends the tenant's duty to pay rent when a dwelling is "unfit for human
habitation."' s The rent withheld must be deposited in an escrow account
until the housing conditions are ameliorated. If the premises are still uninhabitable after six months, the money held in escrow may be used for repairs
or returned to the tenant. Maryland has recently enacted a similar statute
authorizing the tenant to pay rent into court and plead as a defense to a
Code Violations in the District of Columbia, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 190, 195-202
(1967). The proposed bill provides that "[w]henever a tenant . . . shall . . . [file] a
complaint ... alleging violation of the ... Housing Regulations or Code . . .no action
or proceeding to recover possession of such premises shall be maintainable by the
landlord against such tenant, nor shall the landlord otherwise cause such tenant involuntarily to quit such premises, for a period of nine months .... " H.R. 257, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 1250(a) (1967). Exceptions to this general provision allow the landlord to recover possession within the nine-month period if, among other reasons, the
tenant was violating an obligation of his tenancy, or the dwelling is to be recovered
for the personal use and occupancy of the landlord or a purchaser from him, or the
purpose of repossession is to substantially alter, remodel or demolish the premises and
replace it with new construction. See id. at § 1250(a)(1)-(9). The proposed legislation would also prohibit rent increases during the nine-month period, but a significant
exception is made if "[tihe landlord has become liable for a substantial increase in .. .
other maintenance or operating costs not associated with his complying with the
notice of deficiency ...." Id. at § 1251(3).
79. CAL. CIv. CODE ANN.

§§

1941, 1942 (West 1954); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§

42-201, 42-202 (1947) ; N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 47-16-12, 47-16-13 (1960) ; OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 41, §§ 31, 32 (1954); S.D. CODE §§ 38.0409, 38.0410 (1939). Louisiana
has a similar statute which allows the tenant to repair and deduct upon proof that
the repairs are indispensable. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2692-94 (West 1952).
80. CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. §§ 1941, 1942- (West 1954); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§
42-201, 42-202 (1947). The one-month limitation is presently being tested in a California case where the plaintiff-landlord refused to fix a faulty gas line. The defendantstenants hired a plumber to repair the gas line and arranged to pay him in monthly
installments. The tenant pleaded CAL. CIv. CODE § 1942 as a defense to a suit for unlawful detainer and argued that it applies so long as the monthly installments do not exceed
the rent. Earle v. Lachelli, No. 598854 (San Francisco Mun. Ct., answer filed Feb. 21,
1968).
81. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Purdon 1967).
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landlord's action housing conditions which constitute "a fire hazard or a
serious threat to the life, health or safety of occupants ....

,,82

New York has several statutory provisions which relieve the tenant from
paying rent while the premises remain in a deteriorated state. The court may
stay a proceeding to dispossess a tenant for nonpayment of rent, or stay an
action for rent upon proof that the condition of the premises is such as to
"constructively evict" the tenant.8 3 The tenant must deposit rent due in

court, and the court in its discretion may release moneys so deposited to pay
bills for necessary repairs. When the stay is vacated, the landlord is entitled to
the balance. This "constructive eviction" standard has been criticized as being
too vague.8 4 The provision allowing landlords to recover back rents once the
repairs are made has been objected to since the lessor may easily procrastinate
and evade the purpose of the statute. The landlord, for example, may refuse
to provide heat during the winter, purchase fuel in the spring, and then re85
cover the back rents paid into court, thereby avoiding winter fuel costs.
Abatement of rent is also authorized under New York's Multiple Dwelling Law. If a "rent impairing" violation exists in a multiple dwelling which
"constitutes ... a fire hazard or a serious threat to the life, health or safety of
6
occupants thereof," no rent may be recovered by the landlord.8 However,
the effect of this provision is severely weakened in that the tenant must wait
six months after notice of the "rent-impairing" violation is given the landlord by the Department of Housing and Buildings before rent can be abated.
For the tenant residing in a dwelling which needs immediate repairs, this
statute is obviously inadequate. Furthermore, if the tenant voluntarily pays
rent which he would be entitled to withhold, he cannot thereafter recover
it.87 Finally, the so-called Spiegel Law authorizes a public welfare official to
withhold rental benefits to welfare recipients who are living in housing ac88
commodations "dangerous, hazardous or detrimental to life or health.

82. MD. ANN. CODE art. 4, § 459 (1968 CCH MD. ADVANCE SESs. L. REP. 619).
83. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTIONS § 755 (McKinney Supp. 1967).
84. See Comment, Rent Withholding and the Improvement of Substandard Housing,
53 CALIF. L. REV. 304, 324-25 (1965). A New York case decided under this statute
held that conditions such as windows not readily openable, bathroom tile floors in need
of repairs, improperly fitted doors, bathroom waste stoppers in need of repair, con-

cealed leaks, and a hole in a wood floor did not amount to constructive eviction entitl-

ing tenants to a stay of proceedings. DeKoven v. 780 West End Realty Co., 48 Misc. 2d
951, 266 N.Y.S.2d 463 (Civ. Ct. 1965).
85. Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REV. 801, 845
(1965).
86. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 302-a (McKinney Supp. 1967). This provision also
permits the tenant to set up as a defense to an action for possession or rent the "rent
impairing" violation, but the tenant must deposit rent due in court.
87. Id. at § 302-a(3) (d).
88. N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAW § 143-b(2) (McKinney 1966). The Spiegel Law was
held not violative of the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution in two cases.
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Such action by welfare officials is a valid defense to a suit by the landlord for
nonpayment of rent. Difficulties with this enactment are the vagueness in the
"dangerous, hazardous, detrimental" standard, the investment of too much
administrative power in welfare officials, and the restriction of the provision
89
to welfare recipients.
In addition to the problems of administerng such statutes, rent-withholding
or rent-abatement threatens to drive slum landlords out of business. This fear
has been well-stated as follows:
[Rent strikes, abatement, and withholding] all share the common
assumption that the landlord can be whipped into line by the exertion of financial pressure, [but] their prospects for success raise some
serious questions.
Insofar as these schemes deny the landlord the funds which would
ordinarily be used for repairs, they are in a sense self-defeating, and
thus tend to intensify the very problem they are designed to solve.
The hope, of course, is that the expenditure of money for needed
repairs will be less costly to the landlord than the abandonment of
his rents. . . . However, the focus of our concern is the seriously deteriorated building . . . . With such properties, the landlord is able

to succeed economically only if he can "milk" the property, taking
his rents while he lets the building deteriorate and stays a step
ahead of code enforcement sanctions. Unless a landlord can afford
to effect the repairs demanded and still make an acceptable profit,
the hoped for economic incentive cannot operate, and the rational
decision for him will be to abandon the building or sell it at a greatly
depressed price .... 90
In the case of such a sale, those who buy "are necessarily the most speculative
of speculators" and will most likely make only the minimum alterations
required to have rents reinstated. 91
Milchman v. Rivera, 39 Misc. 2d 347, 240 N.Y.S.2d 859 (Civ. Ct. 1963), appeal dismissed, 13 N.Y.2d 1123, 196 N.E.2d 555, 247 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1964); Schaeffer v.
Montes, 37 Misc. 2d 722, 233 N.Y.S.2d 444 (Civ. Ct. 1962).
89. 53 CALIF. L. REV., supra note 84, at 330.
90. Sax & Hiestand, supra note 35, at 915-16.
91. Id. at 916-17. The authors give as an example of another method of evasion the
sale of the deteriorated building to an owner of many such properties. The new owner
then begins to repair one property, thus showing good faith. Public officials will
probably give him sympathetic treatment since he is presumably doing the best he
can. Ibid.
The authors conclude that both current judicial remedies and statutory innovations are inadequate. They propose a substantial civil action in tort, i.e., the "slumlord"
maintaining premises in a substandard and blighted condition would commit an actionable tort. The damages awarded should be large enough to offset potential retaliatory eviction and rent increases, and reflect a deterrent element as well. Id. at 875.
The difficulty with this theory is that a potential tort action merely becomes another
insurable risk of the landlord's business. If the premiums of an insurance policy cover-
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Similar legislation recently proposed for the District of Columbia provides:
The Commissioners of the District of Columbia or one or more tenants occupying leased dwelling units may maintain an action in the
District of Columbia Court of General Sessions for an order directing
the deposit of rents into court and their use for the purpose of
remedying conditions that violate the housing regulations of the Dis-

trict of Columbia.92
This "rent trusteeship" is a valid defense to any action or proceeding for
non-payment of rent. 93 If the lease is for less than three years any covenant
or undertaking by a tenant to make repairs is declared void and unenforceable. 94 The tenant's action would be a summary proceeding which may be
commenced if, within fifteen days after the Department of Licenses and Inspections serves a notice of deficiency upon the landlord, he fails to make a
"good faith effort" to undertake repairs. 95
Conclusion

The low-income tenant in the District of Columbia is still confronted with
crises on social and legal fronts. His situation is indeed an unenviable one.
Legal avenues of recovery remain unclear and remedies continue to prove
inadequate in light of an ever-increasing shortage of habitable low-cost dwellings. However, the recent Brown and Habib decisions of the District of Columbia courts and H.R. 257, the bill presently before the House Committee
on the District of Columbia, offer some encouragement towards improving
substandard housing or, at the very least, indicate judicial and legislative
recognition of slum tenants' problems.
Fundamental to any available or proposed remedies of the tenant is the
need to make the fact of a landlord's retaliatory motive an effective defense
to eviction. Summary eviction not only renders fruitless any effort to seek initial relief through the administrative or judicial process, but also threatens
to render moot many appeals designed to test new legal theories of recovery
or defenses. 96 Habib has made the existence of retaliation a theoretical defense to eviction; trial courts must now make it an effective defense in practice
ing this risk are substantially less than the cost of repairs, the landlord may well decide
to pay the premiums and leave the hovel unchanged. If the premiums are high, the
landlord may react to the tort theory as he could react to other 'high cost remedies
-by selling the premises or tearing down the building.
92. H.R. 257, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1237 (1967). A companion bill, S. 1910, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), has been introduced into the Senate. Both bills have been referred
to the Committee on the District of Columbia.
93. H.R. 257, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 601 (1967).
94. Id., tit. III, § 1252.
95. Id., tit. I, § 1238.
96. Note, Habitabilityin Slum Leases, 20 S.C.L. REV. 282, 295 (1968).
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by drawing reasonable inferences regarding landlords' motivations from circumstantial evidence or presumptions. Title II of H.R. 257 forbids any eviction
for a period of nine months after a complaint is made to the Department of
Licenses and Inspections, except in certain specified circumstances; 97 but at
most this would merely provide a "stop-gap period which would enable the
98
tenant to relocate his family."
Brown and Saunders limit the illegal bargain recovery theory to cases
where the leased premises were in violation of the Housing Regulations at the
beginning of the tenancy. The tenant may recover consideration paid before
taking possession or, if the tenant has used the premises, he may properly
defend a suit for nonpayment of rent on the theory the landlord has entered
into an illegal bargain. The District of Columbia appellate cases99 holding that
members of a class protected by regulatory statutes are not in pari delicto
suggest that tenants should recover all rents paid whether the dwelling violates
housing standards before or after the tenancy commenced. Such an extension
of Brown would indeed be highly desirable from the tenant's viewpoint;
unfortunately, given the economic difficulties of operating standard low-cost
housing, it would likely create more problems than it would solve. In fact, the
major benefit of Brown may well be to bring inner-city landlords' support
behind moderate and constructive compromise legislation.
H.R. 257, introduced in the House on January 10, 1967, is still before the
House District Committee. The partial solution afforded by this bill is neither
as insipid as constructive eviction or an action for damages nor as drastic as
the illegal bargain relief. But, as is the case with most complex problems, the
problem of slum housing will not admit of the simple solutions embodied in
one new statute and a few court decisions. A whole web of interacting influences must be resolved to insure amelioration of the critical situation.
Legislation providing federal aid for home ownership should be implemented
to enable many lower-income persons to avoid traditional tenancy problems. 100 Open Housing Laws must be enforced so minority groups can follow
the flight to better and cheaper housing in the suburbs. Vast rapid transit
systems will be required so that those low income families who do move to
97. H.R. 257, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) ; see supra note 78.
98. 36 GEo. WASH. L. REv., supra note 78, at 198. It is interesting to note that S.
2331, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) would make tenants eligible for relocation payments if
they were evicted from substandard and unsafe dwellings. This bill was never reported
out of committee.
99. Cases cited note 41 supra.
100. Such legislation was recently enacted by Congress. The housing bill, S. 3497,
contains a new home ownership program which would enable poor people to buy homes
up to a cost of $15,000, with the federal government paying all but 1% of the interest
on mortgage payments. The measure also authorizes a similar subsidy program for lowrent apartments. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968. Pub. L. No. 90-448
(Aug. 1, 1968).
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suburban and rural areas will be able to reach jobs spread over the metropolis.
Indeed, as a significant factor in the current urban crisis, the problems of low
income tenants can only be remedied by the combined all-out efforts of the
executive, legislative and judicial branches of government.10'
101. An example of the necessary cooperation between the executive and judicial
branches is seen in the efforts of Lorenzo Jacobs, Chief of Housing Division of the District of Columbia Department of Licenses and Inspections, to turn housing inspectors
into "walking information booths," informing tenants of both public and private
remedies and, in particular, of rent-withholding remedies suggested by Brown v.
Southall Realty Co., supra note 99.
At the present time, however, agencies of the District of Columbia government are
defendants in a class action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The class
is composed of tenant unions and councils representing persons residing in public
housing units and private units leased by the National Capital Housing Authority.
Plaintiffs allege that the defendant, National Capital Housing Authority, has failed or
refused to make necessary repairs to the public-housing units. One significant question
is whether the Housing Regulations apply to the federally-owned project. Plaintiffs
joined as defendant the Department of Licenses and Inspections for failure to enforce
the Regulations. Knox Hill Tenant Council v. Washington, Civil No. 1943-68 (D.D.C.,
filed Aug. 1, 1968). For a discussion of the special difficulties tenants face in suits
against public agencies, see Note, Remedies for Tenants in Substandard Public Housing,
68 COLUm. L. REV. 561 (1968).

